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Summary
The reaction time-based concealed information test (RT-CIT) has been used to judge
the veracity of an examinees claim to be naïve by using RTs to test for recognition of
relevant details. Here, we explore the validity of the RT-CIT to generate new knowl-
edge about the incident—the searching CIT. In a mock terrorism study (n = 60) the
RT-CIT not only allowed to link suspects to known crime details, but also allowed to
reveal new crime details well above chance. A simulation study confirms the potential
of the searching RT-CIT and identifies conditions under which it performs best. We
used an archival dataset that met these conditions (high CIT effect, large number of
item repetitions), and found better item classification performance than in the mock
terrorism study. The searching RT-CIT could be a new, promising investigative tool to
reveal new (e.g., crime) details to the investigative party.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
By testing a suspect on crime information that only a perpetrator, a
witness or a victim could have, the concealed information test (CIT)
also known as guilty knowledge test (Lykken, 1959) can connect an
examinee to knowledge about the crime.
To illustrate how the CIT can be used, imagine the following sce-
nario: Two burglars broke into a storage hall of Pravay (a chemical
plant) with the use of a crowbar. They stole large quantities of con-
centrated sulfuric acid that can be utilized to synthesize explosives.
Based on low quality closed-circuit television footage and a terror
watch list, the police bring in a suspect for questioning. He denies all
knowledge about the break in. With the information the police offi-
cers have about the crime, they can construct a known solution CIT by
taking the true crime information (Pravay, crowbar, sulfuric acid; so-
called probes) and adding plausible alternatives (company names, other
tools often used to break in, different chemicals; so-called irrelevants).
When asked about the crime, a naïve person cannot distinguish
between the probes and the irrelevants and therefore does not show
a systematic difference regarding the response to the stimuli. On the
other hand, a knowledgeable person shows recognition of the probes
and may attempt to hide that (Klein Selle, Verschuere, Kindt, Meijer, &
Ben-Shakhar, 2017). These processes are typically accompanied by an
increase in skin conductance response (SCR), response times, and
P300 amplitude as well as a decrease of the heart rate and respiration
line length; all of which can be used to classify individuals into knowl-
edgeable/naïve well above chance (e.g., Meijer, Klein Selle, Elber, &
Ben-Shakhar, 2014; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000;
Suchotzki, Verschuere, van Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, & Crombez,
2017). Classification performances range from an area under the
curve (AUC) of AUC = 0.74 for heart rate to AUC = 0.88 for P300
amplitude (Meijer et al., 2014) with response times achieving
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AUC = 0.82 (Meijer, Verschuere, Gamer, Merckelbach, & Ben-
Shakhar, 2016).1
Detecting if a suspect is involved in the crime of interest is often
not enough. In a real-life scenario similar to the described break in,
the police are not just interested in assessing whether the suspect
may be involved in the burglary, but they are also, perhaps primarily,
eager to prevent the attack. For that purpose, it would be helpful to
get an answer to such questions as: Who is the second burglar? Are
there more people involved? Where is the explosive synthesized and
stored? Where and when do they intend to execute the attack? The
police might have a list of critical infrastructure and possible targets
with many casualties, but to act effectively with limited time and
resources, the police needs to know the target of the upcoming
attack. The approach to tackle this challenge is called the searching
CIT as the police is searching for the probe amongst a set of probable
alternatives. Contrary to the known solution CIT, the police do not
know the crime information in the searching CIT. However, for the
searching CIT to work, it is crucial to have a set of items that includes
the true crime information with a very high probability. If the actual
crime information is included in the CIT, a knowledgeable person does
still recognize this information. The person tries to hide the knowl-
edge which leads to the aforementioned effects (e.g., increased RTs).
Based on the observed data, the searching CIT tries to classify each
item as either being crime irrelevant or crime relevant (i.e., an irrele-
vant item or a probe item). The difference to the known solution CIT
arises in the way the data are analyzed.
The idea of the searching CIT is not new. Autonomic measures
have been used to extract information from groups of participants
with shared complete (e.g., Breska, Zaidenberg, Gronau, & Ben-
Shakhar, 2014; Meijer, Bente, Ben-Shakhar, & Schumacher, 2013) or
partial crime knowledge (e.g., Elaad, 2016) in experiments, and Japa-
nese law enforcements regularly use autonomic measures based
searching CIT (Osugi, 2011).
One of the few single-subject searching CIT studies was con-
ducted by Meixner and Rosenfeld (2011) using EEG. Participants were
assigned either to the guilty condition in which they were asked to
plan a terror attack with three testable crime information (the type of
attack: bomb; location: Houston; time: July) or the innocent condition
in which they planned a vacation. These items were tested against
five irrelevant items in each information category. Therefore, the pro-
bes were always present among the tested items. In order to find the
probes, for each participant, they compared the two items with the
largest mean P300 amplitude within each category. If the difference
(measured by comparing bootstrapped means) between these items
was sufficiently big, it was concluded that the item with the largest
mean P300 is crime relevant (probe), otherwise it was concluded that
there is no probe item in this category and participant. This algorithm
achieved a probe classification accuracy of 67% (chance performance
was 20%). The technical requirements of EEG-systems and the trained
personal needed to administer an EEG are barriers to applying it in
practice and limiting factors when it comes to scalability. The physio-
logical CIT, although cheaper, cannot be scaled up easily for the same
reasons. The RT-CIT, however, requiring only a computer and data
collection and analysis possibly being fully automated, allows for
remote and parallel testing with little additional resources needed.
As far as we know, the present study is the first to explore the
validity and applicability of the reaction time-based searching CIT
(searching RT-CIT). We evaluate two searching algorithms for the sce-
nario where the investigators themselves do not know what the criti-
cal details are (i.e., searching RT-CIT). In contrast to the common
known-solution CIT in which the examinee is tested for critical details
that the examiner knows are related to the crime, we pretend to be
ignorant about the crime and aim to classify the items as crime rele-
vant/irrelevant and use this to classify participants as guilty/innocent
in an airport setting using a mock crime paradigm (Study 1). Based on
these results, the performance of the algorithms under different con-
ditions was explored using a simulation study (Study 2). Finally, the
algorithms were cross validated on independent data (Study 3).
The two algorithms we evaluate are inspired by Meixner and
Rosenfeld (2011), and Noordraven and Verschuere (2013). We expect
above-chance classification performance for the items (Hypothesis
1a) and in a second step for participants (Hypothesis 1b), based on
the item classification for both algorithms.
2 | STUDY 1: APPLYING THE SEARCHING
RT-CIT IN AN AIRPORT SETTING
Study 1 used a mock crime paradigm at an international airport, with a
guilty group that planned a mock terror attack and partially executed
it, and an innocent control group (see Procedure section). Two
searching RT-CIT algorithms were used to detect crime relevant infor-
mation and to classify participants. A priori, we expected both algo-
rithms to show above chance classification performance for items and
participants, but we had no predictions when it came to comparing
the two algorithms.
To draw conclusions about the searching RT-CIT in an airport set-
ting, we first need to validate the known solution RT-CIT in that setting;
an environment with high security standards (enforced by the police)
that, in addition, is relatively unfamiliar to participants and therefore
likely to cause higher agitation levels in all participants than a laboratory
setting at a university does. Thus, we predict a larger standardized
probe-irrelevant difference in RTs (
M probeð Þ−M irrelevantð Þ
SD irrelevantð Þ ) as introduced by
Noordraven and Verschuere (2013) and here forth called CIT-effect)
for participants in the guilty vs. innocent group (Hypothesis 2a). In a
similar vein, we expect the guilty and innocent classification accuracy
based on the CIT-effect to be greater than 50% (Hypothesis 2b).
As a secondary aim, Study 1 also investigated potential effects of
richer memory traces of past actions compared to intentions (e.g.,
Cohen, 1981) on the CIT-effect. Although it has been shown that reac-
tion times can be used to detect intentions with the CIT (Noordraven &
Verschuere, 2013), it is unknown if there is a difference in how well past
actions and intentions can be detected using RTs. The insight we gain is
of high practical relevance as it will show if the RT-CIT is suitable for
exposing planned criminal actions before the crime is committed which
is especially important in the context of terrorism.
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2.1 | Method
The experiment was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty
of Arts and Social Sciences of the University of Zurich (Approval num-
ber: 2018.2.11). The study is exploratory,2 data and code can be
found on osf.io/69yrj.
2.2 | Participants
Participants were 60 students from the University of Zurich (M
age = 22.5 years; SD = 3.1 years, range 19–32 years, 47 female). To
end up with a balanced design, we recruited until we had 60 partici-
pants after applying the preregistered exclusion criteria. Of all the
tested participants (n = 68), 8 were excluded (1 due to poor perfor-
mance in the task [more than 50% errors in at least one item cate-
gory], 6 exceeded the two-error-limit in the post-CIT recognition task,
and 1 participant failed both criteria). Participants were recruited via
participants' mailing-list, postings on bulletin boards at the university
and advertisements in lectures. The participants were enrolled to the
study when the following inclusion criteria were met: age between 18
and 35, high school degree or higher, and fluent in German. Before
the experiment started, all participants were asked to read and sign
the informed consent. It was clearly stated that the participation is
voluntary, and withdrawal is possible at any time during the course of
experiment with full compensation. All participants received 20 CHF
(≈20.40 USD) or course credits for 1.5 hr of study participation (par-
ticipants' choice). All participants were told that they will earn an addi-
tional 5 CHF (≈5.10 USD) if they can complete their task without
being accused of anything (indicated by a search of their hand lug-
gage). They were specifically instructed that simply being suspected is
not enough to lose this bonus. However, independent of their perfor-
mance, all participants received the additional 5 CHF.
Half of the participants were asked to plan for a mock-crime
(guilty suspects; n = 30; M age = 22.10 [SD = 2.80]; 24 female; 23
right-handed). The other half was asked to plan for a non-criminal act
(innocent suspects; n = 30; M age = 22.83 [SD = 3.34]; 23 female; 27
right-handed).
2.3 | Procedure
The experimental procedure consisted of four phases—planning phase,
execution and interception, RT-CIT, and target and probe recognition.
2.3.1 | Planning phase
All participants were contacted by e-mail and requested to bring a
self-packed cabin bag for a day trip with an airplane. It was explicitly
stated that the bag must not contain any forbidden items. The partici-
pants were informed that new security measures and communication
protocols between different divisions of the airport police had been
introduced. Participants were told that this study is part of an airport
security check to test these measures. Upon arrival to the airport, an
experiment leader welcomed the participant and brought him/her to
an office room where he/she read the instructions on a sheet of
paper. The participants in the guilty group were told to take part in a
mock-terror attack to test the newly implemented security measures.
The innocent group was given no additional information beside that
they are to test the efficacy of the new security protocol. All partici-
pants received mock flight documents issued to their name and a map
of the airport. They were given up to 7 min to plan their tasks.
The participants in the guilty condition were instructed to go
to a location marked on the map where they will find an envelope
with a code word on it. The envelope contained a numbered key to
a safe deposit box at the airport in about 5 min walking distance. In
the safe deposit box, they found two items which they should take
within their hand luggage. Item 1 was to be smuggled through the
security check and handed over to a confederate (airside), whereas
Item 2 was to be used as a sign to be recognized by the confeder-
ate. The purpose of each item was explained in the instructions
(see Appendix A). The guilty participants were instructed to care-
fully hide the items in their luggage in order to avoid detection.
After crossing the security check, they were asked to proceed to a
specific gate, take out Item 2, and wear it or hold it visibly until they
are approached by the confederate which they will recognize by a
certain feature (e.g., red shoes) and hand over Item 1. The guilty
participants were also instructed that in case nobody approached
them within 5 min, they should deposit the item at a certain place
and then meet the experiment leader at a location described in the
instructions (see Table 1 for all the items). To control for possible
TABLE 1 Items used in the RT-CIT sorted by enactment (enacted
task/intention) and item category
Enactment Item category Item
Enacted Code word Gondola, magnet, board,
anchor, stamp, clip
Enacted Number of safe
deposit box
Six unique random numbers
from 1 to 98 (newly
generated for each
participant)
Enacted Item 1, to be
smuggled
USB-stick, watch, liquid, phone,
powder, wallet




Intended Gate A81, B34, C06, D55, E27, F19
Intended Confederate
feature
Red shoes, grey pants, brown
jacket, blue scarf, white hat,
golden sunglasses
Intended Item placement In trash can, in PET container,
in aluminium recycling bin,
under seat, behind pillar,
behind door
Intended Meeting spot Information desk, Hour
Passion, Center Bar, Amavita,
Marché, NZZ Café
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item effects, the information used in the instructions was balanced
over the course of the experiment in the sense that within each
category, every item was used exactly five times.
The innocent participants were instructed to go to four specific
stores at the airport that were indicated by numbers on a map they
received. In each store, they were to select an item and write down its
name and price on a sheet of paper received from the experiment
leader. After completing their task, the participants were asked to use
the provided flight documents and go through the security check.
Thereafter, they were told to have 15 min waiting time to be filled as
they wanted. Next, the participants were requested to meet the
experiment leader at the baggage check. This procedure ensured that
innocent participants had to complete a task that took a similar
amount of time as the mock crime, that lead them to the same areas
of the airport, and that also included orienting and planning based on
a map and navigating through the airport preferably relying on their
memory.
All participants (innocent and guilty) executed their tasks as
planned up until they were about to use their flight documents
(enacted tasks). The activities that should have followed after the
security check were considered planned future acts (intentions).
2.3.2 | Execution and interception
Immediately before participants used their flight documents, they
were intercepted by a confederate posing as an undercover police
officer and brought to an office room where they were asked to com-
plete a security test (RT-CIT). The items the guilty participants
encountered before this interception (code word, number on the key,
item 1 and item 2) were considered to be part of the enacted tasks
whereas gate, recognition feature, item placement, and meeting spot
were considered intention-items.
2.3.3 | RT-CIT
Upon entering the CIT-room, participants were orally instructed to
turn off/mute their phone and to put it aside together with their bag
(and possibly other items). They were asked to sit down in front of the
computer and the confederate posing as a police officer informed
them that the following test was designed to determine if he/she has
knowledge about a crime. They were told that all the instructions will
be presented on the screen but if they had a question at any point,
he/she could ask the police officer who stayed in the same room in
hearing distance but not visible.
The RT-CIT was programmed with MATLAB version 9.4.0 (The
MathWorks, 2018) with the Psychtoolbox extension version 3.0.14
(Brainard, 1997) on a Dell Latitude E6530 with a 15.600 screen running
on Windows 7 (Service Pack 1). Participants were seated approxi-
mately 50 cm from the screen.
The RT-CIT consisted of eight item categories (4 past action cate-
gories, 4 intention categories), with six items per category (1 probe, 1
target, 4 irrelevant). In the beginning, participants were asked to learn
the target items to which they should respond with “YES, this is con-
nected to the crime” in the subsequent task. Participants could end
the learning phase on their own as soon as they felt well prepared.
They were then presented with all 48 items of the test and were
asked to click on the target items with the mouse to ensure that the
items have been memorized. The selected items were highlighted to
help the participants to keep track of their choices. Participants with
more than one error in this recognition test received feedback that
they have made more than one error and that they should learn the
target items again. This procedure was repeated until no more than
one error was made.
After passing the target recognition test, the reaction time trials
started. On each trial, a single item was presented in the middle of the
screen, either a probe, a target or an irrelevant item. Participants were
asked to indicate as fast and as accurately as possible whether the
item has a connection to the crime by pressing either “e” or “i” on the
keyboard. The answers were assigned in a way that NO was always
pressed with the participants' dominant hand. The response–stimulus-
interval varied randomly from 500 to 1,000 ms.
There were three practice blocks of 32 trials each to familiarize
the participants with the task before the actual test trials started.
Every item was presented twice in this practice phase. The first prac-
tice block had a response time limit of 10 s. The items remained on
the screen until the participant pressed a button or the time limit was
reached. For the second and third practice phases, participants were
instructed to respond within 1.2 s and 0.8 s respectively. A red “TOO
SLOW” message appeared above the stimulus if the participants did
not respond within those instructed time intervals. However, every
response given up until 1.5 s after the stimulus presentation was
recorded. Participants also received feedback on whether they
responded correctly (i.e., YES to targets, NO to probes and irrelevants)
by indicating errors with the display of a red “X” below the stimulus.
The actual test phase consisted of 20 blocks. In each block, every item
is presented once, resulting in 960 trials in total which took approxi-
mately 23 min to complete. Participants were given the opportunity
for two short, self-paced breaks after blocks eight and fifteen.
2.3.4 | Target and probe recognition
After the RT-CIT ended, there was another target recognition test to
ensure that participants did not forget the targets during the test.
Additionally, participants in the guilty group had to complete a probe
recognition test. They were told that only the guilty participants see
this test, that it is needed to evaluate the study properly, and that
they should, therefore, answer truthfully.3
2.4 | Searching CIT algorithms
In contrast to the known solution CIT, we assume to be ignorant of
the guilt of the participant and about the items that were involved in
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the crime. We applied two searching-CIT algorithms aimed to classify
each item as relevant/irrelevant and each participant as guilty/
innocent.
2.4.1 | Standardization algorithm
Conceptually, the first algorithm that we tried is one in which every item
is treated as the possible probe and compared to all the other items in its
category. Items with CIT-scores above a certain cut-off are classified as
probes, the others as irrelevants. Based on the idea of standardizing the
probe-irrelevant difference within a participant (Noordraven &
Verschuere, 2013), this algorithm uses within category standardized CIT-
scores. For each participant and every item i in item category j, the CIT-
scores are calculated as dCITi, j = (M(RTi, j) − M(RTk 6¼ i, j))/SD(RTk 6¼ i, j). For
participant-classification, we use the mean of the largest dCITi,j scores of
each category dCITp =M(max(dCITi, j)) and classify a participant as “guilty”
if dCITp is above a certain threshold and as “innocent” otherwise.
2.4.2 | First to second bootstrap algorithm
The second algorithm we applied on our RT data has been success-
fully used in the P300 CIT (Meixner & Rosenfeld, 2011). The ratio-
nale behind this algorithm is that the probes should have the
largest RT and that they should only be classified as probe if the
difference to the item with the second largest RT is sufficiently
big. In a first step, the item with the largest mean RT in each cate-
gory is identified for every participant. These items are considered
possible probes. The item with the second largest RT is presumed
irrelevant and will be used for comparison. All other items are also
considered irrelevants, but they are ignored for the rest of the
algorithm.
In a second step, 2000 bootstrap sample means are calculated for
the possible probe and the presumed irrelevant for each category. A
sample is created by drawing (with replacement) as many RTs from the
responses to a given item as there are valid trials for that item. In each of
these 2000 iterations, the mean RT for the possible probe item is com-
pared to the mean RT of the irrelevant item. The m-th bootstrap sample
of category j is denoted Pbootj, m and Ibootj, m for the possible probe and
the presumed irrelevant respectively. The possible probe of category j is
then classified by bootj, the percentage of iterations in which its mean
RT was larger than the mean RT for the irrelevant item
(boot j =
countm M Pboot j,mð Þ>M Iboot j,mð Þð Þ
2000
). Participants are classified based






Target trials, trials with response errors, with unusually slow (i.e.,
1,500 ms or more) or unusually fast (i.e., 150 ms or faster) response
times were excluded from the analysis. 1.58% of irrelevant and probe
trials were excluded.
2.5.1 | Post-CIT recognition
For the final sample of 60 participants, target recognition accuracy
after the RT-CIT was 95.2%. The probe recognition accuracy of the
30 guilty participants was 84.2%. Note that participants with more
than two errors in either test were excluded (and replaced by another
participant) and therefore not included in the final sample.
2.5.2 | Known-solution group analysis
Before we tried the searching CIT algorithms, we verified that partici-
pants in the guilty condition showed larger RT-CIT effects than partic-
ipants in the innocent condition. A one-sided Bayesian independent
samples t test on the CIT-effect between the guilty and the innocent
group (using a weakly informative Cauchy prior; scale = 0.707) was
used to compare the hypothesis H1 (larger CIT-effects for the guilty
group compared to the innocent group) to H0 (no difference in the
CIT-effect between the two groups). The test revealed very strong
evidence for H1 (BF10 = 2.82*10
6) with a between-group effect size
dCITbetween = 1.76 (95% credible interval [1.09, 2.28]) showing that
the guilty group (M dCITwithin = 0.36; SD = 0.22) has larger within-par-
ticipant CIT-effects than the innocent group (M dCITwithin = 0.04;
SD = 0.14; see Table 2).4
2.5.3 | Known solution participant classification
We plotted the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve to
assess if dCITwithin can be used to discriminate between guilty and
innocent participants. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is an
often-used index of diagnostic power (Fawcett, 2006). The AUC
was 0.91 (95% CI: [0.84, 0.98]) and well above chance level. We
used leave-one-out cross-validation (LOO CV) and applied the cut-
off that maximizes the Youden's J statistic (J = sensitivity + speci-
ficity −1; Youden, 1950) in the model building sample for individ-
ual classification. This procedure achieved a cross-validated
classification accuracy of 85% (25 of 30 or 83% of guilty partici-
pants and 26 of 30 or 87% of innocent participants were classified
correctly). For sake of comparison, we note that the commonly
used cutoff d = 0.2 (see Noordraven & Verschuere, 2013) led to a
specificity of 86.7% and a sensitivity of 80% (overall accu-
racy 83.3%).
The reason Youden's J was used is that it is not biased by the
base rate of guilty people in the population under investigation
because it weights an increase of 1% in sensitivity and a 1% increase
in specificity equally. To illustrate this, let us assume 10,000 people
with a guilty base rate of 1% (i.e., 100 guilty, 9,900 innocent people)
should be classified. A 5% increase in sensitivity will classify five addi-
tional guilty people as such which is an increase in accuracy of 0.05%
whereas a 5% increase in specificity will classify 495 additional inno-
cent people correctly which is an increase of 4.95%. However,
Youden's J will in both cases increase by 0.05. Why this is a desirable
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property becomes evident when comparing classifiers from different
scenarios: A naïve classifier that classifies everyone as innocent would
reach 99% accuracy (but J = 0) in this example—an almost perfect clas-
sifier with 100% true positive and 2% false positive would reach 98%
accuracy with J = 0.98. The same two classifiers with a guilty base rate
of 50% would achieve accuracies of 50% and 99% while J remains
unchanged.
2.5.4 | Task enactment: Past versus future
behaviour
A two-tailed Bayesian paired samples t test with a weakly informative
Cauchy prior (scale r = 0.707) was conducted to compare the CIT-
effects of guilty participants in enacted and intent items using JASP
(JASP Team, 2019). We found moderate evidence (B01 = 4.91; 95%-
credible interval [−0.52, 0.39]) that the null-hypothesis stating that
the CIT-effects between enacted and intent items do not differ is bet-
ter supported by the data than the alternative hypothesis that CIT-
effects do differ.
2.5.5 | Searching CIT
Item classification performance of the searching algorithms was
assessed by the Youden's J at the optimal cut-off. As explained
above, accuracy is not a suitable measure when the base rates are
very different from 0.5. A naïve classifier (e.g., “all items are irrele-
vant”) would achieve 90% accuracy because 90% of the to-be-classi-
fied items belong to the irrelevant category. Also, the AUC used in
the known solution participant classification cannot be used with the
first to second bootstrap algorithm because only one item in each
category is classified based on a criterion. This means that if at least
one irrelevant item shows a larger mean RT than the probe in this
category (the probe is therefore automatically classified as irrele-
vant), the algorithm will never reach a sensitivity of 1 no matter how
liberal the criterion is set; which is a prerequisite to interpret
the AUC.
Using LOO CV procedure for item classification, the standardiza-
tion algorithm achieved a Youden's J of 0.37 (sensitivity = 0.68; speci-
ficity = 0.69). Participant classification was above chance with
AUC = 0.68 (95% CI: [0.54, 0.82]) but significantly worse than the
known solution CIT (DeLong's test for two ROC curves: D = −2.98;
p < .01; Robin et al., 2011). LOO CV resulted in a classification accu-
racy of 65% (19 of 30 guilty participants and 20 of 30 innocent partic-
ipants were classified correctly).
The first to second bootstrap algorithm for item classification
achieved a cross-validated Youden's J of 0.33 (sensitivity = 0.50; spec-
ificity = 0.83). It should be noted that this algorithm cannot achieve
any arbitrary sensitivity or specificity; it strongly depends on the num-
ber of the probes that are selected as possible probes in the first step
of the algorithm (in the current study, 120 of 240 probes). Participant
classification was above chance level with an AUC of 0.74 (95% CI:
[0.61, 0.87]) but significantly worse than the known solution CIT
(DeLong's test for two ROC curves: D = −2.33; p = 0.02; Robin
et al., 2011). LOO CV resulted in a classification accuracy of 68% (18
of 30 guilty participants and 23 of 30 innocent participants were clas-
sified correctly).
2.6 | Discussion
In Study 1, we conducted a CIT in an airport setting. The known solu-
tion CIT—to test crime knowledge and to investigate if items related
to an enacted task show larger CIT-effects than items related to
intentions—showed larger CIT-effects for guilty than for innocent
participants with a classification performance (85% accuracy) well
above chance. We found no evidence for an effect of enactment (i.e.,
differences in the CIT-effect for items related to enacted tasks and
items related to future intentions). Although we tried to make the
enacted and intent items and categories comparable (e.g., each con-
tained one alphanumeric non-word and neither contained emotion-
ally loaded items), the mock crime scenario did not allow for
counterbalancing between enacted and intent items. The possibility
that this null effect is due to item selection can therefore not be dis-
carded completely.
For the first time, we showed that RTs can be used to find crime
relevant information and distinguish knowledgeable from naïve partic-
ipants using the searching RT-CIT. Both searching algorithms achieved
item and participant classification on a similar and above chance level.
While encouraging and providing initial evidence for the validity of
the searching RT-CIT, and therefore new applications, it was also evi-
dent that the known solution CIT is substantially more accurate in
classifying participants.
TABLE 2 Mean reaction times (in ms; SDs in parentheses), CIT-effect of innocent and guilty participants by item type and enactment
(enacted, intention, collapsed), and between group effect sizes by enactment
Innocent Guilty
RT RT
Irrelevant Probe Target dCITwithin Irrelevant Probe Target dCITwithin dCITbetween
Enacted 482 (154) 481 (152) 600 (132) −0.00 (0.19) 486 (146) 532 (181) 627 (135) 0.36 (0.30) 1.45
Intention 491 (151) 501 (162) 618 (139) 0.08 (0.21) 502 (151) 551 (182) 646 (148) 0.39 (0.34) 1.07
Collapsed 486 (153) 491 (158) 609 (136) 0.04 (0.14) 494 (148) 541 (182) 637 (142) 0.36 (0.22) 1.76
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3 | STUDY 2: SIMULATION STUDY
The results of Study 1 warrant further exploration on how the
searching algorithms are influenced by different factors. We ran a sim-
ulation study to do so. We simulated a wide array of datasets that var-
ied along the dimensions of CIT-effect size (eight levels:
dCITwithin = 0.2, 0.3, 0.36, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.6, 1), number of item cate-
gories (i.e., information that could be tested; eight levels: 1–8), and
number of trials per item (five levels: 5, 10, 20, 50, 100). This resulted
in a total of 320 (8*8*5) datasets with 1,000 simulated participants
each (500 guilty, 500 innocent). The effect sizes dCITwithin = 0.36 and
dCITwithin = 0.45 were simulated to compare the algorithms' perfor-
mance on the simulated data to their performance on empirical data
with the same effect sizes. The effect size of dCITwithin = 0.36 was the
CIT-effect found in Study 1, dCITwithin = 0.46
5 corresponds to the
CIT-effect found in an independent study (Verschuere &
Kleinberg, 2016) whose data will be used to validate the simulations
in Study 3.
3.1 | Data generation
Data were generated on the trial level with the following assumptions:
(a) People differ in their baseline reaction times. As an estimate of
baseline RTs, we used the reaction time of innocent participants to
irrelevant items. (b) Knowledgeable participants differ in their
response to the probe (e.g., due to different perceived salience of the
probes, or different ability to suppress the initial YES response to pro-
bes) which results in different CIT-effects in knowledgeable partici-
pants. (c) Innocent participants do not recognize the probe and
therefore do not show a CIT-effect. (d) Reaction times on every trial
are influenced by unsystematic noise. For now, we did not include
item-effects or effects of item category.
Following these assumptions, the response time for participant i
on trial j is generated by adding the different components. For inno-
cent participants and for irrelevant items of guilty participants this
results in RTi,j = baseline RTi + noisej and for probe trials of guilty par-
ticipants it is RTi,j = baseline RTi + CIT-effecti + noisej. For both irrele-
vant and probe items, the noise was drawn from a right skewed
distribution with a mean of 0 (exponentially modified Gaussian distri-
butions with a mu = 0, sigma = 56, and beta = 120 for irrelevant items
and mu = 0, sigma = 72, and beta = 154 for probes). These values
were derived from fitting an exponentially modified Gaussian model
to the data of Study 1 (see osf.io/69yrj/ for further information).
Reaction times of targets were not simulated as they do not influence
the analysis.
3.2 | Results
Figure 1 presents the searching CIT algorithms' performance on simu-
lated data with the effect size found in Study 1 (dwithin = 0.36) but
without any item effects (e.g., word length, numbers versus words,
salience). The simulations show a mean maximized Youden's J of 0.47
(sensitivity = 0.68, specificity = 0.79) for the standardization algorithm
when each item is presented 20 times compared to the empirically
observed J of 0.37 in Study 1. The first to second bootstrap algorithm
achieved a mean maximized J of 0.45 compared to the empirically
found J of 0.33 (sensitivity = 0.60, specificity = 0.85). This implies that
with the same effect size and under optimal conditions (i.e., no item
effects) the algorithms could perform better than what we found in
Study 1.
At least four conclusions can be drawn from the simulation out-
comes. First, as observed in Study 1, the simulations indicate that, at
the maximized Youden's J, the standardization algorithm is more lib-
eral (i.e., is more likely to categorize items as probes). This results in a
somewhat higher sensitivity but also a somewhat lower specificity
than the first to second bootstrap algorithm. Second, across all the
simulations (see Appendix B) the standardization algorithm tends to
outperform the first to second bootstrap algorithm. Third, evidently,
the algorithms perform better when the dCITwithin is larger (Figure 2).
Fourth, the simulations indicate that both algorithms would profit
from increasing the number of repetitions per item.
3.3 | Discussion
The goal of Study 2 was to explore the searching algorithms' perfor-
mance in the absence of item effects under various conditions. Both
algorithms show very similar benefits from more repetitions per item
and from larger CIT-effects.
The main differences in item classification performance
between the two algorithms root in the sensitivity limitations of
the first to second bootstrap algorithm. Its sensitivity cannot
exceed the proportion of probes that has been marked as possible
probe in the first step of the algorithm, no matter how liberal the
criterion in the second step.
Direct comparison between the empirical data and the simulated
data with the same effect size showed that item effects seem to influ-
ence the searching algorithms negatively. The performances based on
the simulated data should therefore be considered estimates of the
theoretical ceiling performance.
4 | STUDY 3: VALIDATION ON
ARCHIVAL DATA
The simulation study showed that both algorithms have the potential
to perform better than what we found in Study 1 if the number of
item repetitions is increased or if the CIT effect is larger. Although this
has not been manipulated in the simulation, the comparison between
simulated and empirical data suggests that reducing item effects could
have a considerable impact on the searching CIT performance also. To
validate the algorithms on a second dataset and to show that the
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simulations yield useful ceiling estimates, we applied the analysis from
Study 1 on the autobiographical RT-CIT data from Verschuere and
Kleinberg (2016). This study had the same number of repetitions as
Study 1, larger CIT-effects (which is expected due to the high rele-
vance of the autobiographical information), and possibly smaller items






















































F IGURE 1 Youden's J achieved with the optimal cut-off using the standardization algorithm (left) and the first to second bootstrap algorithm












































1st to 2nd Bootstrap Algorithm
Number of Repetitions 5 10 20 50 100
F IGURE 2 Youden's J achieved with the optimal cut-off using the standardization algorithm (left) and the first to second bootstrap algorithm
(right) on the simulated dataset with eight item categories
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differences in how well the different information was learned (since
the information is autobiographic and does not need to be learned)
and because participants could indicate if an irrelevant item stood out
to them which lead to the exclusion of that item, reducing saliency
effects among the irrelevant items.
4.1 | Method
For a detailed description of the method, we refer the reader to
Verschuere and Kleinberg (2016). The data can be found on osf.io/
cg5es. In brief, an autobiographical RT-CIT was used with five item
categories (first name, last name, university course, birthday, country
of origin) and 20 trials per item for a total of 600 trials. Participants
that were instructed to hide their identity showed a mean CIT-effect
of M(dCITwithin) = 0.46 (SD = 0.23), whereas unknowledgeable partici-
pants had a CIT-effect of M(dCITwithin) = −0.01 (SD = 0.13).
4.2 | Results
Maximizing the Youden's J of the searching algorithms for the empiri-
cal data of Verschuere and Kleinberg (2016) using LOO CV resulted in
a Youden's J of 0.53 (sensitivity = 0.83; specificity = 0.69) for the stan-
dardization and a J of 0.48 (sensitivity = 0.62; specificity = 0.86) for
the first to second bootstrap algorithm. Therefore, both algorithms
showed above-chance classification performance. We also obtained
further indications that the standardization algorithm is more liberal
(at the cost of lower specificity) and that it shows slightly better over-
all discriminability. Figure 3 visualizes the performance of the algo-
rithms in comparison with the theoretical ceiling performance based
on simulated data.6
Participant classification based on the searching algorithms was
with AUC = 0.68 (95% CI: [0.56, 0.81]) for the standardization and
AUC = 0.69 (95% CI: [0.56, 0.81]) for the first to second bootstrap
algorithm above chance for both algorithms.
4.3 | Discussion
The aim of Study 3 was to validate the searching CIT algorithms on an
independent dataset and to show that the simulations yield realistic
results. As predicted by the simulations, both algorithms showed bet-
ter item classification than in Study 1. Furthermore, the finding from
Study 1 that the standardization algorithm is more liberal when the
optimal cut-off is used was replicated.
Study 3, therefore, showed the validity of the searching algorithms
on an independent dataset and presented additional evidence that our
data simulation can be used to estimate the ceiling performance those
algorithms can theoretically achieve given a certain effect size.
5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study used the RT-CIT in a mock-terror attack scenario at






















































F IGURE 3 Youden's J achieved with the optimal cut-off using the standardization algorithm (left) and the first to second bootstrap algorithm
(right) on simulated data with CIT-effect size dCITwithin = 0.45 (lines) and on the empirical data of Study 3 (cross)
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algorithms to reveal critical information about the attack and to clas-
sify participants.
We first showed that the known solution RT-CIT can be applied
in an airport setting with a high classification accuracy of 85%
(AUC = 0.91; using the commonly used cutoff of dCITwithin = .2
resulted in an accuracy of 83.3%). This shows that high accuracies can
also be achieved in situations with possibly higher agitation levels
(due to high security standards, police presence, and the unfamiliar
airport environment) than studies conducted in university settings.
Especially in the terror context, the police are interested in
detecting malicious intent to prevent an attack. To investigate if inten-
tions can be detected to the same degree as past actions, we com-
pared the CIT-effect of items that the participants physically
interacted with to items related to their intentions. We found moder-
ate evidence that the CIT-effect is not influenced by enactment.
These results could be explained in different ways: It could be that
the richness of the memory trace (if the memory of enacted and
intent items is sufficiently strong) indeed does not influence the CIT-
effect. An alternative explanation could be that the effect was masked
by an increased focus on the intent items as they were still relevant to
execute the mock crime successfully. Theoretically, because the mock
crime scenario did not allow us to balance the items between the past
action and intent condition, this finding could also be a result of the
item selection. Although we cannot definitely conclude that enact-
ment does not influence the CIT-effect, our results provide further
evidence that the CIT is well suited to detect memory of past actions
and intentions.
Finally, we set out to investigate whether response times can be
used to reveal new crime details to the investigative party. Study 1
showed that searching CIT algorithms can be used to identify crime
relevant information above chance level. The standardization algo-
rithm showed slightly higher discriminability, but the main difference
was that its sensitivity was higher at the cost of lower specificity com-
pared to the first to second bootstrap algorithm. However, this only
applies when the algorithms are evaluated at their maximized
Youden's J. When the criterion in the standardization procedure is set
to match a certain sensitivity or specificity of the bootstrap procedure,
they both achieve the same performance. Furthermore, the searching
CIT achieved above chance classification performance of participants
into guilty/innocent but both algorithms were considerably worse
than the known solution CIT. Gathering useful information before
testing a suspect with the CIT is therefore still needed to get the most
accurate guilty/innocent classification.
To explore the algorithms' potential under different conditions
and without item effects, we turned to simulated data. Whereas our
simulation study sheds light on what would happen with different
numbers of trials and different effect sizes, it is limited in the number
of factors it takes into account and currently disregards known mod-
erators of the CIT effect (e.g., saliency, countermeasures; Suchotzki
et al., 2017). Both algorithms show very similar benefits from more
repetitions per item and from larger CIT-effects. The simulations fur-
ther indicated that the searching RT-CIT could achieve substantially
better classification performance given the right conditions (i.e.,
increased CIT-effects and more repetitions per item, see Figure 2).
Note that possible effects of habituation and fatigue could not be
taken into account due to the lack of research in this area of the RT-
CIT. Optimization of the paradigm to increase the CIT-effect is very
challenging and will take time, but testing the validity of the RT-CIT
with large numbers of trials and investigating the effects of fatigue
and habituation might give valuable insight and could be done quickly.
In addition, this knowledge could be used to refine the simulations.
Especially in the exploration phase of this new field of searching algo-
rithms in the RT-CIT, data simulation could be a valuable tool to
explore the properties of algorithms. Using simulated data to explore
the behaviour of a system (e.g., algorithm, computational model) in a
wide array of conditions is well established in cognitive psychology
(Sun, 2008) and could be a promising direction for CIT research in
general.
The validation of the results from our simulations using indepen-
dent data is further evidence that our data simulation can be used to
estimate the maximal performance those algorithms can theoretically
achieve given a certain effect size. The remaining discrepancy
between the performance on the simulated and empirical data is most
likely due to item effects in dimensions that are likely to influence the
CIT-effect or response times in general, such as saliency (Kleinberg &
Verschuere, 2015; Verschuere, Kleinberg, & Theocharidou, 2015),
word length (Barton, Hanif, Eklinder Björnström, & Hills, 2014), and
word frequency (Rayner & Duffy, 1986).
In general, both algorithms show very similar classification perfor-
mance with a slight advantage for the standardization algorithm, espe-
cially with small numbers of repetitions per item. Possibly the most
relevant difference between the algorithms is that the classification
criteria of the standardization algorithm can be set freely to achieve
any desired sensitivity/specificity, whereas the first to second boot-
strap algorithm's sensitivity is limited to the proportion of probes that
are considered “possible probe” in the first step. How the criterion
should be set in practice is determined by the circumstances. If high
sensitivity is needed (e.g., terror prevention) the criterion is set lower
than in scenarios with very limited resources that must not be spent
on false alarms—a flexibility that is not achieved by the first to second
bootstrap algorithm.
Another important difference between the algorithms is the sus-
ceptibility to an irrelevant item showing a CIT-effect. This could be
due to an involuntary reaction of a participant to an item or it could
be part of a countermeasure used by guilty participants. While both
algorithms are expected to be affected in a similar way for innocent
participants, the effect for guilty participants can be different. Let us
assume a CIT-effect of that irrelevant item is of the same size as the
actual probe. For the standardization algorithm, this would result in
the same dCITi,j score for this irrelevant item as for the probe, but
they would still be larger than zero and therefore diagnostic. Note
that the dCITi,j score of the probe would be smaller than without an
irrelevant signal because the difference of the means decreases and
the SD of irrelevants increases (see Study 1 for the formula). Using the
optimal cut-off, both items would be classified as probes while the
other irrelevant items of guilty and innocent participants would still be
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classified correctly. Furthermore, M(max[dCITi,j]) could still be used to
classify participants. The first to second bootstrap algorithm would, in
the first step, only treat half of the real probes as “possible probes”
limiting the sensitivity to a maximum of 0.5. The bootstrap compari-
son in step two would take place between the real probe and the irrel-
evant item that showed the same CIT-effect, yielding a mean of
50%—the same as when two irrelevant items of an innocent partici-
pant are compared. In this case, the second step will not improve the
classification. The best performance would be reached when every
possible probe is classified as the probe. Participant classification,
however, would not be possible since this guilty participant would
show no bootstrap difference, just like innocent participants.
The possibility of stronger countermeasures that result in a CIT-
effect of the irrelevant item larger than the CIT-effect of the probe or
of applying countermeasures to multiple irrelevant items must be con-
sidered also. These possibilities lead to a further decrease in classifica-
tion performance for both algorithms but to a lesser extent in the
standardization than in the first to second bootstrap algorithm, follow-
ing the same rational as in the presented example.
From a practical point of view, the standardization algorithm has
the advantage that it takes less computational resources and there-
fore less time, since it does not rely on bootstrapping. For those rea-
sons, we conclude that the standardization algorithm has more
desirable properties and should currently be favoured over the first to
second bootstrap algorithm (Table 3).
Finally, a general limitation of the searching CIT needs to be consid-
ered. In this study, as in most others, the true probe was always present
in the searching CIT which does not need to be the case in practice.
Real-life situations rarely have a closed set possible probes in which the
investigator knows that the real probe is included. This either means
that the searching CIT (irrespective of the measures used) should only
be applied in very rare situations or that an item that covers all other
possibilities should be included. The latter is done in Japan, the only
country that uses the searching CIT on a large scale (Osugi, 2018). The
effects of this practice have yet to be thoroughly investigated.
5.1 | Applicability
The results from the empirical data and the simulations suggest that
the RT-CIT is suitable not only to test if someone possesses specific
crime knowledge (known solution CIT) but also to find unknown crime
information among plausible but crime unrelated alternatives
(searching CIT). The known solution RT-CIT could already be applied
in specific situations such as testing a suspect for crime knowledge as
part of a police investigation, at the border when the police suspect
that the country of origin provided by a person is wrong and they
have a specific suspicion where the person might be from (e.g., by
testing knowledge about lesser known towns of that country), or pos-
sibly testing the knowledge about a substance found in a passengers'
luggage which the passenger claims not to have packed. Our finding
suggests, that it can also be used to test for intentions such as plans
for a journey or a terror attack.
The searching algorithms open up an additional spectrum of sce-
narios in which the RT-CIT can be applied. In the context of an inves-
tigation, for example when the police caught someone carrying illegal
substances, they could use the searching RT-CIT to narrow down or
prioritize where to look for the seller; or in a situation where the
police have some information about a planned terror attack but do
not know where it will take place, but they have a suspect that they
believe to have knowledge about the attack. It could be used to get
hints on where the attack will take place, what kind of bomb to look
for, the day of the attack and alike. Although not addressed in this
study, the searching RT-CITs performance can most likely be
increased if multiple people sharing the same crime knowledge can be
tested, as it has been done with the physiological CIT (e.g., Breska
et al., 2014; Breska, Ben-Shakhar, & Gronau, 2012; Elaad, 2016). This
reduces the impact of one person showing a distinct reaction to an
irrelevant item for any reason.
5.2 | Limitations
Although we used a highly realistic scenario in Study 1 by getting par-
ticipants to the airport, making them execute the mock attack in a
high security environment with real police present, and a believable
cover story, three important aspects are very different from a real-life
scenario. (a) Apart from not getting the monetary bonus of 5 CHF,
there were no negative consequences being classified as guilty. In
reality, this would be an extremely high stakes crime and the suspects
would be very motivated not to be classified as guilty. Although high
stakes crimes need more investigation, the meta-analysis of Suchotzki
et al. (2017) did not find an effect of motivation on the size of the
CIT-effect. (b) The participants were given instructions about the
mock crime, learned them and then planned the execution. Planning
the attack from scratch and considering possible alternatives might
impact the CIT-effect of alternatives that were considered but not
chosen, which might influence the classification performance of both
the known solution and the searching CIT. (c) We used a student pop-
ulation, which is not representative of the general population.
The sample size of N = 60 of Study 1 was not enough to find con-
clusive evidence for the null hypothesis that stated that there is no
effect of enactment, even though the difference in the CIT-effect was
minimal. Although the results are promising, studies with larger sam-
ple sizes are needed to reach conclusive evidence on the matter.















KOLLER ET AL. 11
As with any deception detection tool that might get used in prac-
tice, its susceptibility to countermeasures is an important concern that
needs to be addressed. Suchotzki et al. (2017) found RT-based decep-
tion detection measures to be vulnerable to countermeasures but fur-
ther research is warranted as different RT-based paradigms had to be
analyzed together due to the few countermeasure studies that were
conducted. Furthermore, susceptibility to countermeasures does not
necessarily mean that detection methods cannot be used. If counter-
measures can be detected, this can also be a valuable piece of infor-
mation to the examiner by itself.
5.3 | Future studies
Searching algorithms on RT-CIT data is a research field that remains to
be explored. We encourage other researchers to develop new algorithms
and use simulated data to explore boundary conditions. Promising
research directions include non-binary classifications (i.e., providing a
measure of certainty that the classification is correct), machine learning
approaches, and using converging evidence of multiple algorithms.
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1 AUC = 0.5 represents chance performance; AUC = 1 is perfect classifica-
tion performance.
2 The study was preregistered (osf.io/69yrj/) but that preregistration was
premature and the authors decided to analyse the classification based
on adaptations of already existing algorithms and refrained from calcu-
lating the preregistered Bayesian index I. Since this is an integral part of
the study, it should be considered exploratory.
3 The innocent group did not complete this recognition test because the pro-
bes and targets were counterbalanced. However, innocent participants
were presented with all the items and were asked to indicate the most
plausible one for each category. χ2-tests for each item category showed no
significant effects after correcting for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni).
4 CIT-effects were calculated as: dCITbetween =
M dCITguiltyð Þ−M dCITinnocentð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi





M RTprobeð Þ−M RTirrelevantð Þ
SD RTirrelevantð Þ .
5 dCITwithin = 0.45 is based on initial calculations that contained a mistake in
data aggregation. The correct effect size is dCITwithin = 0.46 but we
refrained from running new simulations because the difference is minimal.
6 Applying the searching algorithms on simulated data with M
(dCITwithin) = 0.45 resulted in J = 0.56 (sensitivity = 0.74; specific-
ity = 0.81) and J = 0.54 (sensitivity = 0.68; specificity = 0.86) for the
standardization and first to second bootstrap algorithm respectively.
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